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Abstract 
Social information ‘nudges’ concerning how others perform typically boost individual 
performances in experiments with one group reference point. However, in many natural 
settings, sometimes due to policy, there are several such group reference points. We 
address the complications that such multiple group social information might introduce 
through an experiment. The boost to average performance is significant and comparable 
to the one group case. Between-group inequality does not change. Individual inequality 
falls, however, because the boost is largest among the pre-‘nudge’ very poor 
performers. Finally, the boost to average performance is highest when individuals 
freely choose their group affiliations.  
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1. Introduction    
People often respond positively to information about the performance of others in real effort 
task experiments (e.g. see Falk and Ichino, 2006, Mas and Moretti, 2009, and Azmat and 
Iriberri, 2010).1 The provision of such information has, as a result, become a popular 
candidate public policy ‘nudge’: e.g., to encourage tax returns and changes in energy 
consumption (see Sunstein and Thaler, 2008, and Halpern, 2015). The evidence, however, 
typically comes from experiments where there is one reference group and, in natural settings, 
there are often several. For example, a particular ethnic group’s average income level 
typically becomes known to members of that group when information is provided about the 
average income of all ethnic groups. Likewise, a UK school’s performance on national tests 
is known through a league table that contains information on other Schools’ performance. We 
consider whether this difference matters. In particular, we report on a real effort task 
experiment where there are two, exclusive group reference points: one refers to the 
performance of the subject’s own group and the other refers to that of another group.2 This 
enables us to consider 3 questions where the existing evidence is negligible or inconclusive. 
I. Does the boost to average individual performance when there is a single group 
reference point generalize to where there are two such reference points? 
II. How does the provision of multiple group reference points affect the level of 
inequality both between individuals and between groups? 
III. Does the mechanism for generating individual group affiliation affect the 
influence of multiple group reference points on performance?  
The first question is important because there are reasons for supposing that the influence of 
social comparison is more complicated in multiple than single group settings. There is not 
only the difference between an individual and his or her group’s behavior (‘within-group’) 
that can occur when there is only the own group reference; there is also the difference 
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between the individual’s group and the other group (‘between-group’). The dilemma over 
whether it is better to be a ‘big fish in a small pond or a small fish in a big pond’ suggests 
both types of social comparison might motivate individuals. If the existence of several group 
references complicates social comparison in this and possibly other ways, then it may, in 
turn, alter how the provision of such group reference points affects behavior.  
Our second question is important because policy makers are commonly concerned with how 
interventions affect both output and the level of inequality in society. There is mixed 
evidence on this from the single group experiments. In most studies, everyone’s performance 
improves (e.g. Azmat and Iriberri, 2010), but in others there is also convergence of individual 
behavior on the group reference point (see Abeler et al, 2011), in part because the boost in 
performance is largely among those performing below the norm (see Mas and Moretti, 
2009).3 Both responses are understandable depending on whether the provision of own group 
information triggers competitive or norm-conforming preferences. Since the presence of two 
exclusive groups might as easily prime competitive instincts as those of group conformism, it 
is an open question how the balance between these two motives will be affected.  
There is an additional aspect to the question of how inequality is affected by social 
information. Groups are often hierarchically differentiated by their performance (as in ethnic 
group incomes and school league tables) and policy makers can be interested in how 
interventions affect group differences as much as individual ones. Will members of a poor 
ethnic group, for instance, respond fatalistically to the information that their average income 
is below that of other ethnic groups? The information may seem to reveal that odds are so 
stacked against them as members of this group that effort appears relatively pointless (as 
happens, for instance, when a counter-culture develops and, with respect to decisions over 
educational efforts, in theories of statistical discrimination and signaling, see Phelps, 1972 
and Spence, 1973). Alternatively, the evidence of what others can achieve may spur efforts to 
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close the gap through some ‘underdog’ or emulation effect. Which is the case obviously 
matters for public policy both in relation to the extent of the boost to performance (question I) 
and the effect on group inequalities (part of question II).   
We tackle the first two questions through an experiment where subjects engage in a real 
effort task (the Gill and Prowse, 2012, slider task) twice, first as isolated (as explained below) 
individuals with no social information (Task 1) and then again (Task 2) as isolated 
individuals with either no social information (Baseline 1) or an own group reference point for 
performance (Baseline 2) or an own and another group reference point (Treatment 1). 
Baseline 1 supplies the control for any changes in performance due to experience. Thus the 
comparison between the change in performance between Task 1 and Task 2 in Baseline 1 and 
Baseline 2 gives the effect of a single group reference point and the comparison of the change 
in Baseline 2 and Treatment 1 gives the effect or two rather than one reference point.  
The reference point(s) is (are) information about the performance of people in their (and the 
other group) at an earlier date. It is not generated endogenously by subjects in the 
experimental session. This is an important part of our experimental design, not only because 
it gives control over the reference point, but also because this is the way, in practice, that 
social information is often generated. For example, members of an ethnic group typically 
receive information through the provision by statistical agencies on average income levels for 
their and other groups in the past; and this year’s Year 12 UK students receive information 
about what the previous year’s Year 12 students did in their GCSEs.4 
There are two group reference points in Baseline 2 and Treatment 1 (but those in Baseline 2 
only know their own and do not know there is another). One group reference point for 
performance is higher than the other to capture group stratification.  In both Baseline 2 and 
Treatment 1 subjects are randomly allocated to groups. The random process reflects how 
many groups are formed, particularly natural ones (e.g., ethnic groups). But, it does not 
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capture how all groups are formed. For this reason in Treatments 2, 3 and 4, subjects select 
their reference group from the same two options as are in Treatment 1, but under different 
choice procedures. We discuss these in more detail below. It is through the comparison of the 
effects of social information across Treatments 1, 2, 3 and 4 that we address question III. The 
question is important for public policy reasons both in anticipating the effects of policy under 
different conditions for group formation and when giving policy advice, where this is 
possible, over how group affiliation should occur. For example, in the case of school league 
table information, do the effects of this public policy depend on whether the allocation of 
individuals to schools is random or arises through parental/individual choice? If they do, then 
an important additional dimension of policy may be the mechanism for allocating individuals 
to schools.      
We discuss the background to these questions and formulate specific hypotheses in the next 
section. Section 3 explains the experimental design in more detail. Section 4 gives the results. 
We find that the provision of multiple group reference points boosts almost everyone’s 
performance and that it tends to reduce the variance in performance because the boost is 
biggest for those, who in the absence of group references, are the very worst performers. 
There are no significant differences in either of these respects between those in the ‘High’ 
performance group and those in the ‘Low’ one. Thus, the provision of multiple group 
reference points raises average performance, it has no effect on between-group inequality and 
reduces within-group inequality. In short, this is a ‘nudge’ that raises performance without 
incurring any cost in terms of increasing inequality; indeed it lowers inequality in one 
dimension. We find that the biggest boost to performance occurs when group affiliation is 
freely chosen; and the weakest effects on performance and on inequality occur when group 
affiliation arises from a mechanism of delegated choice. Section 5 discusses the results and 
we conclude in Section 6. 
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2. Background and hypotheses 
SOCIAL COMPARISON WITH SINGLE AND MULTIPLE GROUP REFERENCE POINTS 
There are a variety of explanations for why social comparison within a group might motivate 
individuals in a single group setting. They can be broadly divided into two according to their 
implication for individual behavior (and hence behavior in the aggregate). First, there are 
preference-based arguments for social comparison that predict a boost in everyone’s efforts. 
For instance, people may have competitive preferences: they like to do better than others. 
They may just like winning (see Parco et al., 2005 and Sheremeta, 2010 on this in contests), 
or they may value the status that comes from visibly being better than others (e.g. see 
Charness et al., 2013). They may alternatively have a preference for self-esteem and 
judgments regarding self-worth often depend on a similar kind of relative comparison for 
epistemic reasons. In each case, in addition to whatever material return comes from 
performance, people also gain some extra psychological benefits when there is social 
information and this boosts everyone’s performance.5 Aggregate performance therefore 
increases, but there is no clear effect on the variance of individual performances within the 
group. This is the basis for H1. 
H1: The provision of a single group reference point boosts individual performances.  
Second, there are norm-based arguments for social comparison that predict behavior will 
converge on the norm. The desire to conform to a norm may arise from ‘group-think’ type 
social pressure within the group or because conformity enables a person to identify more 
strongly with his or her group (e.g. see Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, in the economics 
literature; and Asch, 1951, for some famous early psychological experiments on such 
tendencies to conformism). Those who would otherwise do better than the norm, ease back in 
this case; and those who would lag behind the norm, redouble their efforts to catch up. The 
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impact of social information on overall performance is, thus, unclear. The clear effect is on 
the variance in performance: it should fall with social comparison on this account. This is the 
basis for H2. 
H2: The provision of a single group reference point reduces the inequality of 
individual performances within the group. 
As a preliminary to the 3 questions that motivate our experiment, we test H1 and H2 on the 
effect of single group reference points. While the evidence from single group reference point 
experiments is generally clear on H1, it is not on H2 (e.g. see Azmat and Iriberri, 2010, 
Abeler et al., 2011, Falk and Ichino, 2006, and Mas and Moretti, 2009, where knowledge of 
peers in various forms seems to boost performance).  
The introduction of multiple group reference points could complicate the effect of social 
comparison in a variety of ways. First, it might play into this debate over the ‘within-group’ 
effect.  For instance, it might be argued that the contrast that is made possible when there are 
two groups (and there is exclusive membership of one or the other) primes norm guided 
behavior because any deviation from a group norm may now be associated with membership 
of another group. This might be expected from Social Identity Theory (see Tajfel and Turner, 
1979). Alternatively, if the two groups appear in competition (as they are perhaps more likely 
to when they are stratified into ‘High’ and ‘Low’ groups), then perhaps within-group 
competitiveness will be primed.  
Second, the presence of multiple group references introduces the possibility of another type 
of social comparison: a ‘between-group’ comparison effect (see Frank, 1985).6 Again, there 
are conflicting intuitions over this. It is possible that individuals may identify more strongly 
with a ‘High’ performing group than with a ‘Low’ performing one because membership of 
‘High’ group conveys status. So, whatever are the effects of social comparison, they are felt 
more keenly in the ‘High’ than in the ‘Low’ performing group. This will be reinforced if 
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those in the ‘Low’ group suffer any form of discouragement. Alternatively those in the ‘Low’ 
group may be spurred into special efforts because they are ‘underdogs’ and the gap between 
the groups may narrow.  
With such conflicting arguments and intuitions over questions I and II, our null hypotheses, 
H3, H4 and H5, are that multiple rather than single group reference points have no effect on 
performance and inequality.7  
H3: The provision of multiple group reference points has the same effect on 
individual performances as a single own group reference point. 
H4: The provision of multiple group reference points has the same effect on the 
inequality of individual performances as a single own group reference point. 
H5: The provision of multiple group reference points has the same effect on the 
inequality between group performances as a single own group reference point. 
GROUP AFFILIATION MECHANISM 
Once there is more than one group reference point, the question arises as to how people 
become attached to one rather than another and whether this influences the effect of social 
information ‘nudges’. This is our third research question.  
The mechanism of affiliation might matter because there is some evidence from single group 
reference points that people are more likely to be influenced when they identify more closely 
with their group (see Charness et al., 2013). People may select a group on the basis of past 
performance (or more generally other observable characteristics) with the result that those in 
the same group identify more closely with fellow members because they share more things in 
common with other group members than when affiliation is random. This is a selection effect. 
In addition, the procedure itself may, in liberal societies where freedom of choice is highly 
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valued, encourage greater identification with the group (see Page et al, 2005, for 
experimental support). H6 follows. 
H6: The boost to performance with multiple group reference points is bigger when 
individuals freely choose their group affiliations than when they are randomly 
determined. 
While this is a powerful intuition in liberal societies, it is not the only one.8 For example, 
identity that turns on ethnicity, race or gender is also important in many liberal democratic 
societies, but is not chosen. There is also the thought that, if people choose their group for the 
maximum advantage this gives for social comparison, the self-serving nature of the group 
choice may in turn undermine its psychological power.   
The conditions under which people choose their group affiliation also varies. Free choice in 
H6 is one possibility, but there are others. For example, some groups have monetary 
membership fees: political parties often charge a small fee and so do many sporting 
supporters’ clubs and, implicitly, religious organizations when membership comes with 
expectations about charitable giving. This might affect behavior because there is some 
evidence that the introduction of a cash nexus into otherwise similar decisions generally 
affects behavior (e.g., see Vohs, 2006, where it appears to promote individual self-reliance) 
and, more specifically, there is evidence that a small monetary cost actually lowers the value 
placed on an object (see Shampanier et al., 2007). Thus, the introduction of a monetary fee 
for group membership might weaken the attachment of the individual to the group and hence 
the motivating power of the social comparisons based on membership of that group. This is 
the basis of H7. 
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H7: The boost to performance with multiple group reference points is smaller when 
individuals choose their groups and there is a fee as compared with when there is no 
fee. 
Some choices are also made freely but indirectly through a form of delegation. For example, 
individuals freely choose between job offers, but once a job offer is accepted they accept that 
someone will manage their time in that job, including whether it is spent with one work group 
rather than another. There is some evidence that people are averse to other people making 
decisions for them (see Falk and Kosfeld, 2006) and the introduction of an element of 
delegation where such control occurs may weaken the attachment to the group. This is the 
basis of H8. 
H8:  The boost to performance with multiple group reference points is smaller when 
individuals delegate their choice of group to another as compared with when these 
choices are directly and freely made. 
3. Experimental design 
DESIGN OVERVIEW 
There are 2 Baselines and 4 Treatments. In all, individuals in the experiment engage in a real 
effort task twice (Task 1 and Task 2), always as isolated individuals (as explained below). 
The difference between the Baselines and between them and the Treatments concerns what 
subjects are told before performing Task 2 about group affiliation and what members of their 
(and the other group) have done in the past in this real effort task (= the social information). 
In Baseline 1, there is no social information. Subjects are not affiliated with groups and they 
receive no information about past performance. In Baseline 2, there is social information 
about own group performance in the past. Subjects are told in Task 2 either that they have 
been affiliated with a group where members on average achieved 171 in the past on the real 
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effort task or they have been affiliated with a group where members have on average 
achieved 108 in the past on the real effort task.9  The purpose of the two Baselines is, 1) to 
provide a preliminary check that we obtain the ‘usual’ boost to performance through the 
provision of information about own group performance with the specific real effort task and 
isolation set-up (i.e., H1) and 2) to address the question concerning inequality (i.e. H2). 
Hereafter, the key Baseline is Baseline 2 because we wish to compare the boost from own 
group social information with that which occurs when there are multiple group reference 
points in Treatments 1, 2, 3 and 4. 
In Treatment 1 (Random), subjects are told in Task 2 that there are two groups, they are told 
the average performance in the past for both groups (171 = ‘High’ group and 108 =’Low’ 
group) and that they have been randomly affiliated with one of the groups. We use the terms 
‘High’ and ‘Low’ in this and the remaining Treatments and they always refer to the same 
group reference points for performance (171 and 108 respectively) that were used in Baseline 
2.  For convenience in the presentation of the results, we shall always refer to the ‘High’ and 
‘Low’ groups, even though in Baseline 2, subjects only knew their own group performance 
level (and not the title ‘High’ or ‘Low’ that was associated with these performance levels in 
the subsequent Treatments). 
It is through the comparison of the boost in performance between Task 1 and Task 2 in 
Baseline 2 and Treatment 1 that we address H3, H4 and H5 concerning the effects of multiple 
rather than single group reference points. This comparison is cleanest for this purpose 
because they share the same reference points and allocation procedure to groups and the only 
difference is the presence of a single or multiple reference points.  
Treatment 2 (Free Choice) is the same as Treatment 1, except subjects choose which group to 
affiliate with. The comparison of the boost in Treatment 2 with that in Treatment 1 addresses 
H6. 
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Treatment 3 (Paid Choice) is the same as Treatment 2, except that there is a small cost of 
affiliating with both the ‘High’ and the ‘Low’ group. The cost is the same (to avoid both this 
being a source of difference between groups and the introduction of more than one change 
between treatments) and we test H7 by comparing the boost in performance through the 
social information in Treatments 2 and 3. 
Treatment 4 (Delegation) is the same as Treatment 1 except that subjects choose someone 
who will select a group on their behalf. They nominate one of four previous participants, 
identified only by a number, to choose a group for them. They were informed that each of 
these four participants had taken part earlier and had made a choice of group in the past; and 
by nominating that person, his/her choice would be implemented for the subject.10 The 
comparison between the boost in Treatment 4 and Treatment 1 tests H8. 
Treatments 2 and 3 play a further role in the experimental design. It is possible that subjects 
respond to the information on group performance through higher performance without 
identifying with their own group. This is possible because they could integrate the 
information on the two performance levels into a single social information reference point 
(which they then respond to). In other words, they need not identify with their own group and 
yet they could still respond to the social information ‘nudge’. However, if this was the case, 
then there would be no reason for subjects to select one group rather than another in 
Treatments 2 and 3. Their choices should as a result be random. On the other hand, if subjects 
do identify with their own group and make within-own-group comparisons and between-
group comparisons, then the choice of group will matter. They will not be random and, under 
some conditions, they will be associative (see Falk and Knell, 2004). This is what we find 
(see electronic appendix Table B1). More generally, if own group identification did not vary 
across Treatments (because it was absent in the experiment all together), then there would be 
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no reason to expect that the boost to performance would vary across the Treatments because 
each would then have what is the same provision of two group reference points. 
The group reference points are ‘minimal’ in the sense that the affiliation to groups occurs in 
the experiment. This was another design choice. We made it for two reasons. First, using pre-
existing or natural groups complicates the interpretation of the results because they may 
depend on the specificities of the group. Second, minimal group affiliation enables us to 
study the possible influence of different mechanisms for group affiliation. While the minimal 
group paradigm is well-established in the experimental literature (see Chen and Li, 2009, and 
Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo, 2009) and has these advantages in this context, it has the 
possible disadvantage that the affiliations are very weak. This is, in part, why it is important 
to have the cross check for this possibility in Treatments 2 and 3 where there is group choice.  
Our two group reference points are mutually exclusive. This was again a design choice to 
reflect some important types of multiple group references. It echoes the way, for example, 
that one is either an immigrant or one is not; one is Italian or one is not; one is in the top or 
the bottom set for maths, one cannot be in both.  
EXPERIMENT DETAILS 
A key feature of our design is the control for group reference points. We inform subjects 
about the performance level of the group to which they are affiliated in Baseline 2 and of the 
two groups in Treatments 1-4 and we want subjects to take these group reference points as 
given. Towards this end, we ran several sessions, each of which involved 28 to 34 subjects 
making individual choices in isolation. To ensure that subjects did not perceive any group 
affiliation with those in the laboratory, we recruited subjects to arrive at the experimental lab 
in 10-minute intervals. Once subjects arrived, they were individually seated at a computer 
and they could begin the experiment immediately; and when a subject finished the 
experiment, he/she could leave immediately.  
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Once seated, a subject read instructions at his/her computer. Subjects were informed that they 
would perform a set of independent tasks and that instructions for each task would be 
presented just prior to that task. The first task was the slider task of Gill and Prowse (2012) 
where the subject is presented a screen with 48 sliders that can take values from 0 to 100. The 
task is to position each slider at exactly 50 using the computer mouse. Subjects could work 
on the first task for a total of 16 minutes, with a new screen of 48 sliders being presented 
every two minutes. At any point, the subject could also decide to stop working on this task 
and to move on to the next task by clicking a button at the bottom of the screen. At all times, 
subjects could see the total number of sliders they had positioned correctly. Subjects 
accumulated earnings for the total number of sliders correctly positioned at 50 (before 
moving on to Task 2) at a piece rate of 5 points per slider. To ensure understanding, subjects 
answered control questions and participated in a non-incentivized two-minute practice round 
before beginning Task 1. 
The second task was the same as Task 1: that is, 16 minutes of the slider task at the same 
piece rate. However, before Task 2, subjects were given information on the performance of 
people at an earlier date (except in Baseline 1). In Baseline 2 they were either told that 
members of their affiliated group had in the past either performed at a mean number of 171 or 
108 sliders positioned at 50 in 16 minutes. In the Treatments 1-4, subjects were told that they 
would be affiliated with either a High performance or Low performance group, where again 
the mean number of sliders positioned at 50 in 16 minutes in these groups were 171 and 108 
respectively. The mechanism for affiliation was then described and varied across Treatments 
1-4 in the manner set out above (also see below). Thereafter Task 2 is identical to Task 1 with 
the exception that reference point information was displayed on the top of the screen 
throughout. So, group affiliation had no payoff implications. Before proceeding, subjects had 
to answer control questions, including questions that tested their understanding that group 
affiliation had no pay-off implications.  
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The only detail to add about the mechanisms for group affiliation is that in Paid Choice, 
subjects had to pay a fee of 100 points for the ‘right’ to choose a group.  
Having completed the real effort task twice, subjects undertook three further tasks designed 
to complement the normal demographic information that is used as controls in individual 
level regressions. The third task was a series of incentivized lottery choices intended to 
measure subjects’ risk aversion in the gain and loss domains, ambiguity aversion and 
conformism (Holt and Laury 2002). The fourth task was not incentivized and subjects 
received a fixed payment of 100 points for answering a hypothetical question intended to 
capture his/her degree of self-serving bias (see Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997). The fifth 
task was the Arad and Rubinstein (2012) incentivized 11-20 level-k task.11 
All sessions were conducted at the University of East Anglia. The experiment was completely 
computerized and was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). A total of 244 subjects 
participated in our four main treatments (61 in each), 25 subjects in Baseline 1 and 58 
subjects participated in Baseline 2. Experimental earnings were calculated in points and were 
converted to Pounds at the rate of 200 points to £1. Subjects were able to collect their 
earnings at their convenience after the end of the day’s session. The average subject spent 
about 60 minutes in the lab and earned £13.45 including a £2 show-up fee. 
4. Results 
SINGLE REFERENCE POINT 
Table 1 gives the mean performance on Task 1, Task 2 and the difference between them in 
the two Baselines and the four Treatments. The first two rows address H1 and H2. Wilcoxon 
Signrank tests show that the boost to performance is always significantly different from 0 in 
both Baseline 1 and Baseline 2 (and all the Treatments) and the boost is significantly higher 
in Baseline 2 than Baseline 1 (Wilcoxon ranksum p = 0.0389). Table 1 also provides the total 
number of subjects who drop out in each task and treatment. Every task and treatment has a 
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frequency of around 10% or lower with the exception of Task 1 in the Random treatment. 
These reduced frequencies are consistent with an unsystematic level of noise.  
[TABLE 1] 
Table 2 reports individual level panel random effects regressions on performance, where we 
control for possible learning/boredom and re-start effects through Task number dummies and 
screen number dummies. In addition, we control for subjects’ demographic characteristics 
(age, gender and dummy for international student) and their responses in Tasks 3 through 5.12 
The first column examines performance in Baselines 1 and 2. None of the screen time trend 
dummies are significant. The Task 2 dummy is positive and the interaction between Task 2 
and Baseline 2 is also weakly significant (p-value = 0.062), suggesting, albeit less 
convincingly than in the aggregate data, that the boost to performance in Task 2 is larger in 
Baseline 2.13  
[TABLE 2] 
Result 1 (in favor of H1). Relative to when no reference point is provided, there is 
clear evidence in the aggregate data and weaker but similar evidence in the 
individual data that the provision of a single reference point leads to a boost in 
performance. 
There is no apparent change in the variance of output performance in either Baseline between 
Task 1 and Task 2. The absence of an effect from the single reference point on inequality is 
reinforced when we consider whether those who initially performed below their reference 
point in Task 1 boost their performance by more in Task 2 than those who were performing 
initially above this reference norm. Table 3 disaggregates in this way for Baseline 2 between 
those who received the single High or Low reference point norm. The boost to performance is 
always significantly positive but Wilcoxon ranksum tests show that it is not significantly 
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higher for those who initially scored below the reference norm than those who were initially 
above the norm for the High norm (p=0.4350) and it is only marginally significantly higher 
for those initially performing below the Low norm (p=0.0743).  
[TABLE 3] 
Result 2 (against H2): There is no evidence that the provision of a single reference 
point increases individual inequality in performance. 
MULTIPLE REFERENCE POINTS 
Table 1 shows that the boost to performance in Task 2 is always significantly greater than 
zero for Treatments 1-4. Furthermore, the boost is always significantly greater than that 
found in Baseline 1, where there are no reference points (Wilcoxon ranksum test for Random 
(p = 0.0114), Free Choice (p = 0.0014), Paid Choice (p = 0.0752) and marginally for 
Delegation (p = 0.0952). These Treatment differences are also found in individual regressions 
(see electronic appendix Table B2). The size of the boost, however, appears similar to that 
when there is one reference point in Baseline 2 except in Free Choice where it is higher 
(35.41 cf. 24.14) and Delegation where it is lower (18.77 cf. 24.14).  
We turn now to H3. In Table 1, the average boost for those in the Baseline 2 (24.14) is not 
significantly different from that in the Random Treatment (25.21): Wilcoxon test p-value = 
0.5199. The right column of Table 2 reports the individual regression on the combined 
behavior in the Random treatment and Baseline 2. There is a Baseline × Task 2 interact 
dummy to distinguish whether behavior is different in Task 2 in the Baseline 2 as compared 
with Random. The coefficient on this is not significant, again suggesting no difference in the 
boost.  
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Result 3 (in favor of H3): There is no evidence of a difference in the boost to 
average performance in Task 2 between Baseline 2 (single group reference) and the 
Random treatment (two group reference points with random allocation).  
The variance of performance on Task 2 in Random does fall (as compared with Task 1), 
unlike that in Baseline 2 (see Table 1). We disaggregate along the same lines as Table 3 
between those who performed above or below their reference norm for the Random treatment 
in Table 4. The boost is now strongly significant and larger for those who initially performed 
below the reference norm in the Low group than those who initially performed above the 
norm (p=0.0003). Again there is no difference in boost between initial above and below the 
norm for those in the High reference group.  
[TABLE 4] 
Result 4 (against H4): There is evidence that the provision of multiple group 
reference points reduces individual inequality as compared with the provision of a 
single reference point. 
This result is reinforced when we look at all the two reference point Treatments (1-4) in this 
way in Table 5. The boost is significantly higher for those initially below the norm (than 
those initially above) in the Low reference point groups (p=0.0060) but not in the High 
reference point groups (p=0.9762). 
[TABLE 5] 
As the boosts to performance appear to be strongest among those who initially performed 
below the reference norm in the Low group in the 2 reference group Treatments, we test for 
this formally with individual regressions in Table 6. We divide performance in Task 1 into 
four interval groups and introduce these as dummies interacted with task 2 into the individual 
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performance regression: Upper = 171 and above; Upper Middle = (171, 139]; Lower Middle 
= (138, 108]; and Lower = 107 and below.14 The omitted dummy in this equation is Lower 
and so the coefficients on the other interval dummies capture the difference with respect to 
those in these intervals and the Lower interval group. We find that there is no difference 
among the coefficients on the Upper, Upper Middle and Lower Middle dummies interacted 
with Task 2 (p > 0.10 for all pairwise post-regression tests) and they are significant and 
negative in all Treatments except Delegation. This suggests that the boost in Task 2 for 
individuals in these intervals is significantly less than that of individuals in the Lower interval 
on Task 1 in all Treatments except Delegation.  
[Table 6] 
Result 5 (Robustness check of result against H4): The very lowest performers (i.e. 
those below 108) in Task 1 increase their performance on Task 2 by significantly 
more than other individuals when there are 2 group reference points, except in the 
Delegation Treatment. 
Result 5 is potentially consistent with both the preference based and convergence on norm 
bases explanations of the influence of social information. That there is no evidence, however, 
to support the inference that high initial performers reduce their performance towards the 
norm in Tables 5 and 6 counts against the norm convergence account.  
Result 6 (against the norm convergence account): There is no evidence that those 
whose performance in Task 1 is above the norm in their group conform to this norm 
by reducing their performance in Task 2. 
Turning to the inter-group dimension of inequality, a Wilcoxon test shows no significant 
difference in the boost between High and Low groups in Baseline 2 (p = 0.3386) or in all 
treatments with multiple reference points combined (p = 0.3956).  This result is also robust 
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across Treatments (Random: p = 0.6431; Free Choice: p = 0.3638; Paid Choice: p = 0.8356; 
Delegation: p = 0.4735). Individual task regressions yield the same conclusion: the group 
affiliation dummy is never significant (see electronic appendix Table B3). 
Result 7 (in favor of H5): There is no evidence that the boost to performance in Task 
2 is different for those affiliated to the High group as compared with those in the Low 
group.  
We turn now to the possible influence of the mechanism of group affiliation that is revealed 
by the comparison across the 2 reference points Treatments. The Wilcoxon test for aggregate 
differences suggests it is higher under Free Choice than Paid Choice and Delegation at 10% 
level (p = 0.072 and p = 0.090, respectively). We also test for differences through Treatment 
dummies interacted with Task 2 in the individual performance regressions in Table 7. The 
omitted Treatment dummy is for Random. Focusing on the All column, the coefficient on 
Free Choice interacted with Task 2 is positive and significantly different at the 10% level 
from the omitted Treatment dummy (Random) and it is higher than the other Treatment 
dummy interacts (which are not significantly different from zero). The difference between 
Free Choice × task 2 dummy and the other choice dummies × task 2 is significant in both 
cases (p = 0.0494 for Paid Choice and p = 0.0105 for Delegation). 
[TABLE 7] 
Result 8 (weakly in favor of H6 and more strongly in favor of H7 and H8): The 
boost to performance on Task 2 is higher under Free Choice than in the other 
Treatments, and most clearly when compared with Paid Choice and Delegation.  
4. Discussion 
These results, taken at face value, are important and new.  
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They are new because, to our knowledge, multiple group social information ‘nudges’ have 
not been examined experimentally. The evidence on social information ‘nudges’ comes from 
single group reference points. This is a weakness because in many natural settings there are 
multiple groups. Although this means there are no direct cross checks with the other 
experiments in the literature, there are points of comparison. For instance, the boost to 
performance in our experiment with a single reference group (17.2%) is similar to that found 
in Azmat and Iriberri (2016) when there is a single reference group and a piece rate payment 
system (=17.3%) and Falk and Ichino (2006) when there is a single group and a flat payment 
(=16.3%). Neither of these comparator experiments allowed a statistical test of whether this 
performance boost was related to performance prior to the provision of a group reference 
point because both rely on between subject comparisons. Nevertheless, there is some 
suggestion in Falk and Ichino (2006) that, in the same way as we find, the biggest boosts 
occurred among low performers. This is consistent with what also appears to be the case in 
the Mas and Moretti (2009) experiment with respect to poor initial performers and it is a 
stronger result with respect to the good performers (= above average in their study). It is also 
consistent with the findings of some peer group studies (see Carrell et al., 2009).  
The results are important, not least for their policy implications. First, a social information 
policy ‘nudge’ appears generally attractive. It boosts individual performance similarly in 
multiple group settings as when there is a single reference group; and there is no adverse 
effect on inequality.15 Indeed, individual inequality falls because the biggest boosts are 
among the low individual performers.  
Second, notwithstanding this general encouragement, a policy maker has to be aware of how 
group reference points are generated because the effects are not the same. They are weakest 
when group affiliation occurs through a mechanism of ‘delegated choice’ and to a lesser 
extent ‘paid choice’.16 The former is consistent with the evidence from other experiments on 
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control aversion (e.g., see Falk and Kosfeld, 2006). The latter counts against the common 
intuition that people value something they pay for, but it is consistent with experimental 
evidence that money priming encourages individual self-sufficiency and so could weaken 
attachments to a group.  
Third, the policy of promoting consumer choice in the provision of public services needs 
careful assessment. This policy is typically designed to encourage efficiency through greater 
competition and is supported by the provision of information on public service performance 
(as, for example, in school and hospital league tables in the UK).  The evidence from this 
experiment suggests caution in associating any gains with competition per se because much 
of its effects may be coming from what is, in effect, the social information ‘nudge’ aspect of 
the policy. 
In addition, the results are important because they give some insights into the mechanisms 
responsible for these social information effects. There is, for example, no evidence to support 
convergence to a group norm or the development of a counter-cultural norm of low 
performance in the Low group. A preference based explanation of the response to social 
information is better supported by the data (see Results 2 and 6). There is also evidence, 
consistent with other findings in the experimental literature, that free choice encourages 
identification with a group while small monetary fees and delegating decisions over 
membership detract from this identification.  
5. Conclusion 
There is evidence that the provision of social information, a group performance reference 
point, affects individual performance positively and so can act as policy ‘nudge’. What is not 
known from the existing literature is whether the effects on individual behavior are similar 
when there are multiple, exclusive groups. This is an important gap because many group 
reference points naturally arise in a context where there is more than one group and whether 
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there are one or many group reference points is itself often a policy choice. It is also not clear 
from the existing experimental literature whether the provision of group reference points 
affects not only average performance but also the inequality of performance across the 
population. This is important because policy makers often care about both average 
performance and its individual variability across the population. Our experiment addresses 
both issues. In addition, it examines whether the mechanism generating group affiliation, 
itself often a policy choice, affects the influence of such social comparisons. 
We find that a social information ‘nudge’ with multiple groups boosts average performance 
by a similar amount to a single group ‘nudges’. We also find individual inequality usually 
falls and group inequality is unchanged. In particular, individuals who initially perform 
among the worst produce the biggest boost in performance after the provision of the group 
reference points. The exception to this conclusion is that the boost among the very weakest 
performers does not occur when group affiliation is generated through a form of Delegated 
choice. There is also some evidence that the boost to average performance is weakest in these 
circumstances too. In contrast, we find that the average boost is generally largest when group 
affiliation is freely chosen.  
In short, a social information ‘nudge’, judged in these respects, appears rather attractive but 
its attraction does depend on how group affiliation is generated. 
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1 There are also experiments where other types of social information (e.g., over other 
people’s wages and rights) also affect performance (e.g., see Charness et al, 2016) and there 
are experiments where peer effects are small or non-existent (see Georganas et al, 2015, 
Bellemare et al, 2010, and Beugnot et al, 2013). 
2 There are many experiments with multiple groups that have focused on how group 
membership affects strategic behavior in interactions between members of different groups 
(see Ball et al, 2001). But to our knowledge, there seem to be virtually none that are 
concerned with how information about other groups’ performance (as well as one’s own) 
motivates behavior in what is in other respects a non-strategic setting. Grossman and Komai 
(2013) provide an unusual recent example where there are two such groups, but they study a 
slightly different question with respect to envy. There are a rich and a poor group, each has 
its own hierarchy of earnings and taken together they establish the overall (society) hierarchy 
of earnings. They are concerned with whether subjects envy those who are better off within 
their group and/or within the society as a whole. They find evidence of both but within group 
envy is the most powerful.  
3 And in others there is no effect at all (see Eriksson et al, 2009). A further reason for 
tentativeness in summarizing the literature is that studies like Falk and Ichino, 2006, and 
Azmat and Iriberri, 2016, are between subject designs and do not readily allow a test for 
whether some subject groups are more inclined to respond to group reference points than 
others. Our within subject design facilitates such tests. 
4 Stereotypes have a similar comparative character and temporal structure in the sense that 
they are based, albeit more or less loosely, if at all, on previous behaviors and they inherently 
relate a group’s behavior to that of other groups. They, thus, potentially function as a form of 
informal social information ‘nudge’. 
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5 Azmat and Iriberri (2010) offer a different information-based account of the influence that 
relative information has on behavior by applying what they refer to as ‘self-perception 
theory’ in relation to individual ability. On this account, information about average 
performance boosts (lowers) performance of those above (below) the reference point and so 
stretches the distribution of performances. They find no evidence of this and neither do we.   
6 Also see Falk and Knell (2004) who develop a model where people select their reference 
point and argue that there are two similar considerations in such a choice: self enhancement 
(which comes in these terms from being a big fish in small pond) and self-improvement 
(which comes from being in a big pond).  
7 It is perhaps worth emphasizing that although we are interested in such disputes over the 
psychology of social comparison, we are not primarily interested in deciding between them 
here. Our primary concern is with how multiple group reference points affect behavior. It is 
enough for us that there are such debates so as to render this a plausible (and interesting) 
open theoretical question that can therefore be usefully examined empirically.  
8 The impact of different rules of how groups can be formed endogenously – affecting two 
groups (insiders and outsiders) has also been analyzed in the context of provision behavior in 
public good games (Ahn et al., 2008; 2009). 
9 Prior to running our main experiment, we ran two sessions where 62 subjects performed the 
slider task for up to 30 minutes. The mean number of sliders positioned correctly in the last 
16 minutes by the top and bottom halves were, respectively, 171 and 108.  
10 Our aim was to generate an equal probability of being assigned to the high as the low group 
under ‘Delegation’ so that it was comparable in this respect to ‘Random’. We asked 
randomly chosen participants from our preliminary sessions (where, recall, subjects 
performed only the task with no group affiliation for up to 30 minutes) a non-incentivized 
hypothetical question after the experiment concerning whether they would choose to affiliate 
someone else with a High or Low performance group. After 4 such decisions, we achieved a 
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set such that there was 50-50 probability of being High/Low and so these 4 became the set of 
delegated choosers in the ‘Delegation’ treatment.   
11 This was the only task for which earnings depended on the decisions of another subject. At 
the end of the day’s session, subjects were anonymously and randomly paired with another 
subject from the same day. The two subjects’ earnings for this task were determined based on 
their choices in the 11-20 task.  
12 For brevity, we do not present coefficient estimates of these control variables. These 
variables did not have a significant impact on performance.  
13 Unlike Gill and Prowse, 2012, Benndorf et al, 2014, Araujo et al., 2015, and Georganas et 
al., 2015, we do not find a time trend in the screen data, but the re-start effect is consistent 
with a general kind of learning.  
14 We chose 139 as it is the mid-point between 108 and 171.  
15 The boost from the social information nudge in this context is particularly interesting 
because this is a real effort task where there is evidence that material incentives have little 
effect on performance (see Araujo et al, 2015). 
16 This difference (and the others across Treatments reported in Result 8) are also important 
because they would not be expected (just as associative choice in Treatments 2 and 3 would 
not be expected) if our subjects were responding to the two group references as a single 
information nudge (i.e. they attached no special weight to their own group reference point).  
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Mean individual performance 
 N Task 1 
Drop-
outs 
Task 1 
Task 2 
Drop-
outs 
Task 
2 
Difference 
Baseline 1 - No ref 25 144.96 3 158.32 4 13.36***  
  (47.25)  (47.74)  (12.57) 
Baseline 2 – One ref 58 140.19 4 164.33 5 24.14*** 
  (44.72)  (44.92)  (40.69) 
Random affiliation 61 137.34 12 162.56 6 25.21*** 
  (41.54)  (39.95)  (29.24) 
Free choice 61 121.05 6 156.46 2 35.41*** 
  (47.93)  (33.39)  (37.88) 
Paid choice 61 129.36 8 152.57 5 23.21*** 
  (51.25)  (49.47)  (27.42) 
Delegation 61 125.92 9 144.69 8 18.77*** 
  (38.02)  (41.36)  (33.02) 
Standard deviations in parentheses. The *** indicate that, in all treatments, the boost in 
performance in Task 2 is statistically significant at the 1% level using a Wilcoxon signed 
rank test. 
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Table 2. Individual performance – the effect of reference point(s) 
 
Baseline 1  
(no ref)  
vs  
Baseline 2  
(single ref) 
Random  
(multiple ref)  
vs  
Baseline 2  
(single ref) 
Task 2 dummy 2.733*** 2.953*** 
 (0.609) (0.559) 
   
Screen # in Task 1 0.149 -0.101 
 (0.098) (0.110) 
   
Screen # in Task 2 -0.106 -0.051 
 (0.104) (0.078) 
   
Baseline 2 dummy -0.457 1.515 
 (1.994) (1.196) 
   
Baseline 2 × Task 2 1.402* -0.191 
 (0.750) (0.826) 
   
Constant 21.14*** 25.45*** 
 (5.201) (3.795) 
   
Controls?  Yes Yes 
Observations 1328 1904 
Dep. variable: Individual Performance on each screen. Standard 
errors clustered on subject in parentheses.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p 
< 0.01.  
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Table 3: Only Baseline 2 – two separate reference points 
 All  
Below the norm after 
Task 1 
Above the norm after 
Task 1 
 
Mean 
Task 1 
Mean 
Task 2 
Obs 
Mean 
Boost 
z [p] Obs 
Mean 
Boost 
z [p] 
Baseline 2  
High ref 
153.66 175.45 19 22.42 2.536 10 20.6 2.807 
(38.13) (40.61)  (49.08) [0.0112]  (10.54) [0.0050] 
         
Baseline 2 
Low ref 
126.72 153.21 7 57.43 1.690 22 16.64 3.280 
(47.35) (46.92)  (72.48) [0.0910]  (21.05) [0.0010] 
Column All includes aggregate mean performance in Task 1 and Task 2. The other columns 
present the mean of the boost in individual performance (Task 2 – Task 1). Figures in 
parentheses are standard deviations. The last column presents test-statistics [p-values] for 
Wilcoxon sign rank tests for Boost = 0. 
 
 
Table 4: Only Random – two separate reference points 
 All  
Below the norm after 
Task 1 
Above the norm after 
Task 1 
 
Mean 
Task 1 
Mean 
Task 2 
Obs 
Mean 
Boost 
z [p] Obs 
Mean 
Boost 
z [p] 
Random  
High ref 
145.18 165.54 24 20.25 3.230 4 21 1.826 
(35.99) (42.01)  (25.90) [0.0012]  (18.31) [0.0679] 
         
Random  
   Low ref 
130.69 160.03 10 60.5 2.701 23 15.78 3.712 
(45.19) (38.58)  (42.26) [0.0069]  (12.87) [0.0002] 
Column All includes aggregate mean performance in Task 1 and Task 2. The other 
columns present the mean of the boost to individual performance (Task 2 – Task 1). 
Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. The last column presents test-statistics [p-
values] for Wilcoxon sign rank tests for Boost = 0. 
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Table 5. Means and Tests for zero performance boost by initial performance relative to 
norm in Treatments 1-4 
 All  
Below the norm after 
Task 1 
Above the norm after 
Task 1 
 
Mean 
Task 1 
Mean 
Task 2 
Obs 
Mean  
Boost 
z [p] Obs 
Mean 
Boost 
z [p] 
All groups 128.42 154.07 138 29.66 8.328 106 20.43 8.358 
  (45.10) (41.69)  (41.25) [0.0000]  (15.61) [0.0000] 
            
High 
groups 
  
132.98 156.76 104 24.74 7.276 25 19.76 4.253 
(46.66) (42.69)  (38.35) [0.0000]  (12.81) [0.0000] 
            
Low 
groups 
  
123.29 151.05 34 44.71 4.335 81 20.64 7.247 
(42.91) (40.51)   (46.52) [0.0000]   (16.45) [0.0000] 
Column All includes aggregate mean performance in Task 1 and Task 2. The other columns 
present the mean of the difference in individual performance (Task 2 – Task 1). Figures in 
parentheses are standard deviations. The last column presents test-statistics [p-values] for 
Wilcoxon sign rank tests for Difference = 0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36                                                                                                                                                                              
Table 6. Individual performance by interval groups on Task 1 (Random effects model) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All Random Free choice Paid choice Delegation 
Task 2 49.68*** 49.07*** 63.05*** 43.75*** 38.08*** 
 (6.230) (12.84) (13.46) (11.11) (13.84) 
      
Upper 117.4*** 112.1*** 118.1*** 141.7*** 109.2*** 
 (5.173) (7.445) (10.80) (11.80) (12.00) 
      
Upper-middle 85.68*** 76.01*** 84.93*** 99.33*** 87.39*** 
 (4.740) (6.481) (9.618) (10.32) (12.03) 
      
Lower-middle 57.71*** 57.56*** 57.45*** 66.13*** 56.14*** 
 (4.727) (6.552) (9.340) (10.99) (11.48) 
      
Upper -30.68*** -35.37** -42.30*** -20.25* -22.83 
× Task 2 (6.726) (14.04) (13.73) (11.96) (16.22) 
      
Upper-middle -32.94*** -29.07** -43.41*** -30.07*** -24.74 
× Task 2 (6.512) (13.05) (13.97) (11.40) (15.30) 
      
Lower-middle -32.17*** -31.07** -37.00*** -31.32** -24.65* 
× Task 2 (6.903) (14.78) (14.10) (13.63) (14.97) 
      
Constant 82.84*** 134.8*** 59.14** 57.70 27.81 
 (16.45) (30.82) (23.33) (35.76) (37.83) 
      
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 488 122 122 122 122 
Dep. variable: Individual Performance on each task, leading to 2 observations per individual. 
Standard errors clustered on subject in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 7. Individual performance with Treatment dummies 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Groups High Groups Low Groups 
Task 2 25.21*** 20.36*** 29.33*** 
 (3.784) (4.747) (5.789) 
    
Free Choice -13.46 -0.233 -19.85* 
 (7.960) (11.81) (10.23) 
    
Paid Choice -3.214 -4.521 -5.094 
 (8.269) (9.276) (13.75) 
    
Delegation -7.819 -17.41* 1.915 
 (7.216) (9.352) (10.07) 
    
Free Choice 10.20* 13.31 7.461 
× Task 2 (6.192) (9.085) (8.715) 
    
Paid Choice -2.000 3.399 -7.233 
× Task 2 (5.367) (7.143) (7.312) 
    
Delegation -6.443 -1.751 -10.37 
× Task 2 (5.707) (8.501) (7.367) 
    
Constant 169.4*** 192.7*** 129.6*** 
 (26.95) (38.65) (37.98) 
    
Controls? Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 488 258 230 
Dep. variable: Individual Performance on each task. Standard errors clustered on subject in 
parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. After regression (2), no treatment 
differences. After regression (3), Free vs. Paid, p = 0.0628; Free vs. Delegation, p = 
0.0249. 
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Electronic Appendix 1: Experimental Instructions 
 
Thanks for taking part in this experiment. 
You are the only person booked to start at this time. 
You will be paid £2 for turning up plus whatever you earn in the experiment. The experiment 
requires you to perform 5 independent tasks. Further instructions will be given before each 
task. You can earn points in each task. You will be told how many points you obtained in 
each task at the end of the experiment. These points will then be converted into cash at a rate 
of £1 per 200 points. More instructions about how to collect your money will be provided at 
the end of the experiment. 
To begin task 1, press OK. 
 
TASK 1 
You will see a series of screens. Every 2 minutes a new screen will appear. In each screen, 
you will see 48 sliders. Each slider has values from 0 to 100. Each slider will appear at 
position 0. The slider can be adjusted and readjusted an unlimited number of times and the 
current position is displayed to the right of each slider. 
Your task is to position each slider at exactly 50 with your mouse. You get 5 points per each 
slider you have positioned at 50.Suppose you position 5 sliders at exactly 50 then you will 
earn 25 points. 
After 16 minutes, you will automatically be taken to the next task. You can also choose to 
move on to the next task at any time before the 16 minutes. This is done by clicking on the 
`next task´ button at the bottom of the screen. 
Before you start this task, there will be a 2 minute practice screen. 
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Quiz before Task 1 (after practice screen): 
1. Choose the correct one:  
x The slider can be adjusted and readjusted an unlimited number of times and I will 
earn 5 points for every slider I move 
x The slider can be adjusted and readjusted an unlimited number of times and I will 
earn 5 points for each slider that it is positioned at 50 before the time runs out 
x I will not be paid for this task 
x The slider can be adjusted and readjusted an unlimited number of times and I will 
earn 10 points for each slider that it is positioned at 50 before the time runs out 
2. I can move to the next task: 
x at the end of 16 minutes 
x when I press the `next task´ button 
x either of the above 
x after 2 minutes 
 
TASK 2 
Your task is, again, to position sliders at exactly 50 with your mouse. 
Random Treatment: Before you carry out the task, you will be affiliated randomly either 
with a `high performance´ or a `low performance´ group.  
Free Choice Treatment: Before you carry out the task, you must choose a group affiliation. 
You can be affiliated with either a `high performance´ or a `low performance´ group. 
Paid Choice Treatment: Before you can carry out the task, you must choose a group 
affiliation. But there is a fee of 100 points for the affiliation. You can be affiliated with either 
a `high performance´ or a `low performance´ group. 
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Delegation Treatment: Before you carry out the task, you must select a person to determine 
your group affiliation. There are four people, numbered 1-4, who have chosen an affiliation 
for someone else. The choice of the person you select will determine your affiliation. You 
can be affiliated with either a `high performance´ or a `low performance´ group. 
This affiliation will NOT affect the points per slider that you get by positioning the slider at 
exactly 50: that is you get 5 points per slider. On average, members of the `high performance´ 
group position 171 sliders at exactly 50 and members of the `low performance´ group 
position 108 sliders at exactly 50. 
Remember that you will have a maximum of 16 minutes to carry out your task this time. 
Every 2 minutes a new screen with sliders will appear. In each screen, you will see 48 sliders 
as before. Each slider has values from 0 to 100. Each slider will appear at position 0. The 
slider can be adjusted and readjusted an unlimited number of times and the current position is 
displayed to the right of each slider; and you get 5 points per each slider you have positioned 
at 50. 
After 16 minutes, you will automatically be taken to the next task. You can also choose to 
move on to the next task at any time before the 16 minutes. This is done by clicking on the 
`next task´ button at the bottom of the screen. 
 
Quiz before Task2: 
1. Choose the correct one:  
x The slider can be adjusted and readjusted an unlimited number of times and I will 
earn 5 points for every slider I move 
x The slider can be adjusted and readjusted an unlimited number of times and I will 
earn more money for each correctly position slider if I am in the `high performance´ 
group 
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x The slider can be adjusted and readjusted an unlimited number of times and I will 
earn 5 points for each slider that it is positioned at 50 before the time runs out 
x I will not be paid for this task 
x The slider can be adjusted and readjusted an unlimited number of times and I will 
earn 10 points for each slider that it is positioned at 50 before the time runs out 
2. I can move to the next task: 
x at the end of 16 minutes 
x when I press the `next task´ button 
x either of the above 
x after 2 minutes 
3. Choose the correct one:  
Random Treatment: 
x I will be assigned to a group depending on my previous performance 
x I can choose any group 
x I will be assigned randomly to a group 
Free Choice Treatment: 
x I should choose the group exclusively depending on my previous performance 
x I will be assigned randomly to a group 
x I can choose any group 
Paid Choice Treatment: 
x I should choose the group exclusively depending on my previous performance 
x I have to pay a fee and I will be assigned randomly to a group 
x I can choose any group but I have to pay a fee 
Delegation Treatment: 
x I can choose the groups from 1 to 4 
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x I will be assigned randomly to a group by choosing a number from 1 to 4 
x I must select a person from 1 to 4 and that person will determine the group 
 
Group choice/assignment before Task 2: 
There are two groups `high performance´ (average: 171) and `low performance´ (average: 
108). 
 Random Treatment: You have been randomly assigned to group `high performance´ or `low 
performance´ 
Free Choice Treatment: Which group do you choose?  
x high performance  
x low performance 
Paid Choice Treatment: This choice will cost you 100 points. Which group do you choose?  
x high performance  
x low performance 
Delegation Treatment: You must select a person to determine your group affiliation. Which 
person do you select to determine your group affiliation?  
1  2  3  4 
Person <person choice> had selected `high performance´ <or `low performance´>. 
 
Information displayed on the top of the screen in all treatments:  
Your group is high performance <or low performance>. In 16 minutes, people correctly 
positioned, on average, 171 sliders in the high performance group and 108 sliders in the low 
performance group. 
Currently, the number of correctly positioned sliders is: 
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TASK 3 
You now need to make 10 decisions for each of four successive computer screens. Each 
decision is a paired choice between two options (for example, "Option A" and "Option B"). 
You will make ten decisions and record these in the final column, but only one of them from 
each computer screen will be used in the end to determine your earnings. You will only know 
which one at the end of the experiment. 
Before you start making your ten choices, please let us explain how these decisions will 
affect your earnings for this part of the experiment. After you have made all of your 
decisions, the computer will randomly select which of the ten decisions will be used to 
determine your earnings. In relation to this decision, the computer will then randomly select 
the outcome based on the probabilities assigned to the option you chose.  
As an example, assume that, for the randomly selected decision, the option to the left pays 
100 points with a 10% chance and 50 points with a 90% chance, while the option to the right 
pays 80 points with a 20% chance and 45 points with a 80% chance. Assume that you chose 
the option to the left for this decision; then there is a 10% chance that will earn 100 points 
and a 90% chance that you will earn 50 points. 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. 
 
Information displayed on the top of the screen in all treatments:  
Risk Aversion screen: No information displayed.  
Ambiguity Aversion screen: ?% chance means that you do not know how likely each 
outcome is. Two unknown probabilities add up to 100%. 
Loss Aversion screen: You will lose points in this period. 
Conformism screen: It would be nice if some of you were to choose Option __ . 
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TASK 4 
In this task, you will be given 100 points for answering a hypothetical question.  
Imagine that you have been given a job. The same job has been given to another person. Both 
of you have the same skills and qualifications for the job. You completed the job in 10 hours. 
The other person completed the job in 7 hours and was paid £42. 
In your opinion, what would be the fairest amount for you to be paid (between £0 and £100)?  
Submit your suggestion: ______ 
TASK 5 
There will be many people participating in today´s experiment. You will be randomly 
matched with one of them. Neither of you will be told who the other participant is. Both of 
you receive the same instructions: 
Each of you must choose a number between 11 and 20 (decimals are not allowed). Each of 
you will receive an amount of points 10 times the number you have chosen.  
A participant will receive an additional 200 points if he or she chooses a number that is 
exactly one less than the number that the other participant has chosen. 
 
Quiz before Task 5: 
Choose the correct one:  
x The amount of points I earn is the number I choose times 10 and if I choose exactly 
one number lower than the other person, I will be paid 200 extra points 
x The amount of points I earn is the number I choose times 10 
x If I do not choose a lower number than the other person, I will not earn anything 
Choose your number: _____ 
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Electronic Appendix 2: Additional Analyses 
Table B1. Group choice and performance on task 1 
 
Performance 
Class in Task 1 
Free group choice Paid group choice 
Low High 
Associative 
choosing Low High 
Associative 
choosing 
Upper 0 8     0.000*** 3 9     0.047** 
Upper-Middle 8 6     0.605 2 17     0.001*** 
Lower-middle 13 7     0.057* 9 5     0.090* 
Lower 13 6     0.032* 6 10     0.773 
Total 34 27 
 
20 41 
 
 
Note: The column Associative choosing indicate the level of significance of a binomial test 
for is the hypothesis of a probability equal to 0.5 versus the alternative of associative 
choosing (i.e. Upper classes favor high group and Lower classes favor low group) where *** 
is at 1%, ** at 5% and * at the 10% level.  
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Table B2. Individual performance – the effect of multiple reference points vs no 
reference point 
 (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Random Free Choice Paid Choice Delegation 
Task 2 dummy 1.307** 2.349*** 2.972*** 3.165*** 
 (0.631) (0.626) (0.511) (0.596) 
     
Screen # in Task 1 -0.255* 0.0382 0.134 0.0597 
 (0.134) (0.109) (0.0932) (0.0978) 
     
Screen # in Task 2 -0.193* -0.132 -0.175* -0.292** 
 (0.101) (0.0836) (0.0995) (0.106) 
     
Treatment dummy -0.372 -1.533 -0.166 -1.277 
 (1.343) (1.352) (1.473) (1.305) 
     
Treatment × Task 2 1.593*** 2.782*** 1.302** 0.731 
 (0.590) (0.700) (0.579) (0.625) 
     
Constant 28.33*** 6.466 22.72*** 17.64** 
 (4.843) (5.302) (6.875) (5.679) 
     
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1376 1376 1376 1376 
Dep. variable: Individual Performance on each screen. Standard errors 
clustered on subject in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table B3. Individual performance – the effect of the group 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All Random Free choice Paid choice Delegation 
Task 2 dummy 27.76*** 29.33*** 36.79*** 22.10*** 18.96*** 
 (2.885) (5.905) (6.646) (4.556) (4.647) 
      
High group 9.463* 11.39 20.82* 3.245 -8.583 
 (5.627) (10.47) (12.39) (14.19) (11.43) 
      
Task 2 × High -3.981 -8.976 -3.127 1.656 -0.358 
 (4.239) (7.651) (10.35) (7.118) (8.592) 
      
Constant 161.1*** 221.7*** 54.72 229.1*** 124.3* 
 (26.38) (48.77) (56.90) (69.93) (64.05) 
      
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 488 122 122 122 122 
Dep. variable: Individual Performance on each task. Standard errors clustered on subject in 
parenthesis. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
